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In 1970, Congress enacted RICO to eradicate organized crime in
America. To enlist the help of private citizens in this effort, the statute in-
cluded civil provisions providing treble damages for plaintiffs who proved
that they were injured by a pattern of racketeering activity. As the decades
passed, civil RICO dramatically expanded its reach, addressing misconduct
in a diverse array of contexts, including high-profile suits against the Clin-
ton Foundation and Trump University. This Article examines this evolu-
tion, focusing on three factors that have figured prominently in civil
RICO’s runaway growth: the broad interpretation of what constitutes a
RICO “enterprise”; the flexibility ascribed to the requirement that members
of the enterprise work towards a “common purpose”; and the present am-
biguity, created by the U.S. Supreme Court, in defining proximate causa-
tion in this context. To illustrate the extent to which RICO litigation has
moved away from its original mission, this Article concludes by discussing
the civil RICO lawsuit filed in December 2017 against Harvey Weinstein
and his associates by women alleging sexual misconduct that compromised
their employment prospects.
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I. INTRODUCTION
IN 1970, Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-ganizations Act (RICO)1 to combat the pernicious effect of organ-ized crime on the economic vitality of the United States.2 A Senate
report in support of the legislation highlighted, to that end, the billions of
dollars dissipated annually based on widespread “force, fraud, and cor-
ruption” used to infiltrate and compromise labor unions and other legiti-
mate business entities.3 The statute included both civil and criminal
provisions, with early cases focusing almost exclusively on the latter.4
Consistent with congressional intent, these prosecutions targeted classic
“racketeering” schemes that preyed upon legitimate economic activity5 or
sought entry into a legitimate business by criminal means.6
In the 1980s, civil cases exploded onto the scene7 in novel contexts
outside congressional contemplation, including claims against investment
banks8 and restaurant owners.9 This shift led the U.S. Supreme Court to
lament in 1985 that the statute’s use against “respected businesses” repre-
sented an evolution “into something quite different” from RICO’s origi-
nal conception as a tool against the “archetypal, intimidating mobster.”10
Four years later, in an address to the Brookings Institution, Chief Justice
1. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 922,
941–44 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2012)).
2. See Pamela Bucy Pierson, RICO, Corruption and White-Collar Crime, 85 TEMP. L.
REV. 523, 535–37 (2013) (discussing the focus of federal legislators and law enforcement
officials on organized crime in creating RICO).
3. S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1969, S. REP.
NO. 91-617, at 1 (1969).
4. The Second Circuit noted that the decade following RICO’s enactment saw the
publication of very few civil cases. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 486 (2d Cir.
1984), rev’d, 473 U.S. 479 (1985). The Department of Justice concurred, commenting that
the statute’s civil provision was “largely ignored” in the legislation’s early years. See U.S.
DEPT. OF JUST., CIVIL RICO: A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS 1 (1988).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 355 (9th Cir. 1975) (charging a
conspiracy between teamsters and a trucking company to force meat packers to use the
services of the trucking companies through intimidation); United States v. Stofsky, 527
F.2d 237, 240–41 (2d Cir. 1975) (alleging that union officers in New York’s garment indus-
try were accepting bribes from manufacturers); United States v. Green, 523 F.2d 229, 231
(2d Cir. 1975) (alleging “a large-scale conspiracy” among officers and employees of a New
Jersey trucking company to steal frozen seafood from New York City piers).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 433–35 (2d Cir. 1974) (alleging a
scheme to acquire a gambling casino on a Caribbean island by converting money collected
on the casino’s account and then lending the money back to its owner).
7. For example, approximately 1,000 civil RICO cases were filed per year from 1985
to 1990. H.R. REP. No. 101-975, at 7 (1990).
8. See, e.g., Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 756 F.2d 230, 231 (2d Cir. 1985), aff’d on reh’g, 903 F.2d 176 (1990) (action against
investment firm and its money market subsidiary for fraud-based civil RICO violations);
Police Ret. Sys. v. Midwest Inv. Advisory Servs., Inc., 706 F. Supp. 708, 710–11 (E.D. Mo.
1989) (suit against advisors and brokers for civil RICO violations).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Ianiello, 824 F.2d 203, 207–09 (2d Cir. 1987) (appointing
receiver to manage an eating establishment operated in violation of various RICO
provisions).
10. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499–500 (1985).
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Rehnquist called upon Congress to amend civil RICO to restore its focus
on organized crime and away from the “garden-variety civil fraud cases”
more properly litigated in state courts.11
Congress did not accede to the Chief Justice’s request. Thus, unsurpris-
ingly, the twenty-first century has seen civil RICO continue to proliferate
and far outflank its criminal counterpart.12 The movement away from or-
ganized crime has also continued, as an ever more diverse array of claims
have sounded in RICO. In the past two years alone, federal courts have
upheld civil RICO complaints in vastly different contexts, including: mis-
representations by pharmaceutical companies,13 real estate fraud,14 mis-
conduct in divorce and child custody proceedings,15 and Fourth
Amendment violations by police officers.16 It is fair to say that, if some-
one were to survey recent civil RICO cases, she would be very surprised
to learn that organized crime was the primary target—or a major target at
all—in its creation.
Efforts to extend RICO even further persist. On October 18, 2013, a
class action suit was filed by former students of Trump University claim-
ing that they were cheated out of thousands of tuition dollars by fraudu-
lent marketing claims.17 On March 24, 2015, the chairman of Freedom
Watch, Inc. sued Bill and Hillary Clinton and the Clinton Foundation
under RICO for racketeering based on their noncompliance with docu-
ment requests asserted under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act.18 On
February 22, 2017, the Arizona Senate approved a bill that attempted to
add “rioting” to the offenses that trigger liability under the state-law ana-
logue to federal RICO.19 Inspired by concern over alleged violence and
property damage tied to political protests, the Republican-sponsored leg-
islation would outlaw the planning of, and participation in, protests even
11. See William H. Rehnquist, Remarks of the Chief Justice, 21 ST. MARY’S L.J. 5, 9
(1989) (originally presented at the Brookings Institute’s Eleventh Seminar on the Adminis-
tration of Justice, Apr. 7, 1989). Commentators also urged reform. See, e.g., Gerald E.
Lynch, A Conceptual, Practical, and Political Guide to RICO Reform, 43 VAND. L. REV.
769, 802 (1990); Norman Abrams, A New Proposal for Limiting Private Civil RICO, 37
UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (1989).
12. For example, between 2001 and 2006, civil RICO filings averaged 759 per year.
However, during those same years, an average of only 212 criminal RICO cases were re-
ferred to United States Attorney’s Office. See KRISTIN M. FINKLEA, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R40525, ORGANIZED CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: TRENDS AND ISSUES FOR CON-
GRESS 15 (2010); Caroline A. Mitchell, Jordan Cunningham & Mark R. Lentz, Returning
RICO to Racketeers: Corporations Cannot Constitute an Associated-in-Fact Enterprise
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4), 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1, 3 (2008).
13. See In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 804 F.3d 633, 634 (3d
Cir. 2015); In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 712 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 2013).
14. Frydman v. Verschleiser, 172 F. Supp. 3d 653, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); see also John-
son v. KB Home, 720 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1120–21 (D. Ariz. 2010).
15. Murphy v. Farmer, 176 F. Supp. 3d 1325, 1344–46 (N.D. Ga. 2016).
16. O’Toole v. City of Antioch, No. 11-CV-1502-PJH, 2015 WL 5138277, at *11–12
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2015).
17. Complaint at 4–14, Cohen v. Trump, No. 3:13-cv-02519-DMS-RBB (S.D. Cal Oct.
18, 2013).
18. Klayman v. Clinton, No. 15-cv-803880, 2015 WL 10857500, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 14,
2015).
19. S.B. 1142, 53rd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2017).
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before they turned violent.20 In opposing the bill, one Democratic senator
argued that it represented “a total perversion” of the “racketeering pro-
cess” under RICO.21
While these novel initiatives have not always proven successful,22 the
cost of litigation and the threat of treble damages23 has led to high-profile
settlements. For example, on March 31, 2017, U.S. District Judge Gonzalo
Curiel approved a twenty-five million dollar settlement in the Trump
University case.24 Previously, attorneys for Donald Trump had publicly
criticized the complaint’s legal foundation, labeling the RICO claims an
“overreach” since “[n]ot a single case plaintiff cites comes close to ap-
proving civil RICO claims on the garden-variety consumer claims
here.”25 Victories such as these, splashed over the national news and pre-
ceded by hyperbolic rhetoric, embolden further innovation from plaintiffs
who see a landscape where RICO has become untethered from its histori-
cal foundations and traditional notions of racketeering-based injury have
incrementally receded.
This article explores one of the most important pieces in RICO’s run-
away expansion: the statutory provision that allows private parties to sue
for racketeering-based injuries.26 Part I provides a brief overview of civil
RICO. Parts II and III discuss modern case law with a view towards un-
derstanding how and why the statute has become so broad a vehicle for
vindicating financial harm. Part II focuses on RICO “enterprises”; Part
III identifies the confusion surrounding proximate causation. Reflecting
on civil RICO’s evolution, Part IV then turns to one of the highest profile
civil RICO cases in recent history: the complaint against Harvey Wein-
stein and his associates filed in December 2017 by women alleging sexual
misconduct that has irreparably damaged their career prospects.
20. S.B. 1142 defines rioting as follows: “A person commits riot if, with two or more
other persons acting together, such person recklessly uses force or violence or threatens to
use force or violence, if such threat is accompanied by immediate power of execution,
which either disturbs the public peace or results in damage to the property of another
person.” Id.
21. Bob Christie, AZ Senate OKs Racketeering Charges for Riots, ASSOC. PRESS (Feb.
23, 2017), http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/arizona/2017/02/23/arizona-senate-
oks-racketeering-charges-riots/98296298/ [https://perma.cc/E4BC-EVT2] (comments of
Sen. Steve Farley).
22. For example, the federal district court dismissed the RICO claims against the
Clintons and their Foundation. Klayman, 2015 WL 10857500, at *8.
23. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2012).
24. Low v. Trump Univ., LLC, 246 F. Supp. 3d 1295, 1298–99 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (approv-
ing settlement in the Order Granting Joint Motion for Final Approval of the Proposed
Class Settlement).
25. Josh Gerstein & Maggie Severns, Trump Fights Racketeering Claim in Trump Uni-
versity Suit, POLITICO (June 18, 2016, 4:12 PM), https://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-
radar/2016/06/donald-trump-racketeering-claim-trump-university-224517 [https://perma.cc/
NT9S-VP2L].
26. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962, 1964(c) (2012). RICO also provides for criminal penalties based
on racketeering activity and conspiring to engage in such conduct. This article will not
address these issues. For a comprehensive summary of criminal RICO, see Dylan Ben-
singer, Connor Curtin, Matthew Evola, & Austin McCullough, Racketeering Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1673, 1676–1715 (2016).
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II. CIVIL RICO IN RELEVANT PART
To make out a civil RICO claim, a plaintiff must prove: conduct of an
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity and injury to busi-
ness or property by reason of a substantive RICO violation.27 The term
“enterprise” is defined broadly as “any individual, partnership, corpora-
tion, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individ-
uals associated in fact although not a legal entity.”28 This definition
includes business relationships that are both legitimate and illegitimate;
thus, a group of individuals associated in fact for the purpose of engaging
in illegal conduct, such as trafficking in narcotics and bribing local offi-
cials, is an enterprise for RICO purposes.29
Racketeering activity includes a broad array of chargeable offenses
under state and federal law. These include bribery, theft, fraud, violent
felonies, immigration offenses, and the sexual exploitation of children.30
To establish the requisite pattern of racketeering, the statute requires
proof of at least two predicate acts within a ten-year period.31 Plaintiffs
must also show that the acts are related and either amount to, or pose a
threat of, continued criminal activity.32 The U.S. Supreme Court has de-
scribed the requisite continuity as “both a closed- and open-ended con-
cept, referring either to a closed period of repeated conduct, or to past
conduct that by its nature projects into the future with a threat of
repetition.”33
RICO authorizes a variety of civil remedies. Section 1964(a) empowers
the Attorney General and private parties to seek various equitable orders
pertaining to racketeering enterprises, including: divestiture, restrictions
on future activities, and dissolution or reorganization.34 Section 1964(c)
adds treble damages and attorney’s fees for private plaintiffs who prevail
on civil RICO claims.35
III. RICO “ENTERPRISES”
Proof of an enterprise is an indispensable requirement of RICO com-
plaints that distinguishes them from routine tort or fraud claims.36 As
27. See, e.g., Williams v. Mohawk Indus., 465 F.3d 1277, 1282–83, 1286–87 (11th Cir.
2006).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2012).
29. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 578–85 (1981). While Turkette focused
on criminal RICO, Congress presumptively intended for civil RICO to operate similarly in
this context. See Michael Goldsmith & Penrod W. Keith, Civil RICO Abuse: The Allega-
tions in Context, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 55, 78 (1986).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (defining “racketeering activity”).
31. Id. § 1961(5).
32. H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989).
33. Id. at 241.
34. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1964(a)–(b).
35. Id. §§ 1962, 1964(c).
36. For a thoughtful discussion of the enterprise requirement and its primacy in RICO
litigation, see Randy D. Gordon, Of Gangs and Gaggles: Can a Corporation be Part of an
Association-in-Fact RICO Enterprise? Linguistic, Historical, and Rhetorical Perspectives, 16
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 973 (2014).
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indicated above, a RICO enterprise includes a group of persons function-
ing as a continuing unit for a common purpose of engaging in a course of
conduct.37 From this broad definition, two important issues have emerged
that are especially important in the civil RICO context. First, to what
extent must the unit operate as a hierarchy or some other formal decision
making structure? Second, how aligned must the interests be among the
parties to the enterprise to constitute a “common purpose”?
A. STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed RICO’s structural requirements
head-on in Boyle v. United States.38 The defendant was part of a loosely
organized group that carried out a series of bank thefts in different states
over a roughly nine-year period. Apart from several core members, par-
ticipation in the thefts varied from crime to crime, as did the nature of the
heists.39 The group had no discernable leader or hierarchy, nor did it ap-
pear to operate according to any long-term blueprint or master plan. In-
stead, the participants in any given crime would typically meet in advance
to plan the crime, gather any necessary tools, and assign roles (such as
lookout and wheelman). They would then split the proceeds acquired
from the theft.40
At trial, the defendant requested a jury instruction requiring the gov-
ernment to prove his membership in “an ongoing organization” with “a
core membership that functioned as a continuing unit, and an ascertaina-
ble structural hierarchy distinct from the charged predicate acts.”41 The
judge refused the request, instructing the jury instead that an enterprise
can consist of “an association of individuals, without structural hierarchy,
form[ed] solely for the purpose of carrying out a pattern of racketeering
acts.”42 Thus, the shifting membership and lack of coordinated leadership
of the group in which Boyle participated would not preclude the jury
from finding that it was a RICO “enterprise.”
The Court upheld the judge’s instruction, reasoning that a RICO enter-
prise did not require hierarchy, members with fixed roles, established
rules and regulations, or a formal decision making process. The group
must simply function as a continuing unit that pursues a course of con-
duct that may be characterized by “spurts of activity punctuated by peri-
ods of quiescence.”43 In the dissent, Justice Stevens opined that nothing
in the statute’s text or legislative history supported the majority’s conclu-
sion that a RICO enterprise could consist of an “ad hoc association of
thieves” that coalesced at different times with varying participants when-
37. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 576 (1981).
38. 556 U.S. 938, 940–41 (2009).
39. The group typically targeted night-deposit boxes, but occasionally attempted bank
robberies and bank-vault burglaries. Id. at 941.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 943.
42. Id. at 942.
43. Id. at 948.
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ever a tip disclosed the potential vulnerability of financial institutions.44
Boyle’s clarification of the structural requirements of RICO enterprises
resolved a split that had developed among the circuits. Some had adopted
Boyle’s approach;45 others had not. For example, the Eighth Circuit had
held that the enterprise element required proof of “an ascertainable
structure distinct from that inherent in the conduct of a pattern of racke-
teering activity,” as well as a system of authority that directs the group’s
activities on more than an ad hoc basis.46 The Third47 and Tenth Cir-
cuits48 had also emphasized that the enterprise must be separate “from
the pattern of activity in which it engages.”
In holding that association-in-fact enterprises did not need to have a
business-like structure that exists apart from its criminal acts, the U.S.
Supreme Court implicitly rejected the primacy of the organized crime
model and its hierarchy of dons, capos, and lower-level associates.49 The
expansive understanding of enterprise has facilitated civil RICO claims in
diverse areas not considered by Congress when debating the statute that
is arguably outside RICO’s intended purview. Consider, for example,
O’Toole v. City of Antioch.50 In this case, plaintiffs alleged that various
police officers conducted illegal searches and seizures to acquire money,
narcotics, and other items for resale and self-enrichment. Defendant
Wielsch moved for summary judgment on the civil RICO claim filed
against him by two of the plaintiffs, arguing that the acts in which he
participated with two of the other defendants did not constitute an enter-
prise since the associations among the three were sporadic, with each de-
signed to accomplish a specific goal.
Consistent with Boyle, the court did not find that the ad hoc nature of
the relationships undermined the existence of an enterprise, nor did the
complaint’s allegation of a far broader enterprise involving multiple of-
44. Id. at 959 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Goldin Indus. Inc., 219 F.3d 1271, 1275 (11th Cir. 2000)
(finding that an enterprise is “an association of individual entities, however loose or infor-
mal, that furnishes a vehicle for the commission of two or more predicate crimes”); Crowe
v. Henry, 43 F.3d 198, 205 (5th Cir. 1995) (association-in-fact enterprise must be ongoing,
exist “separate and apart from the pattern of racketeering,” and employ a hierarchical or
consensual decision making structure).
46. United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842, 855–56 (8th Cir. 1987); see also United
States v. Smith, 413 F.3d 1253, 1266–67 (10th Cir. 2005) (requiring “a decision-making
framework or mechanism for controlling the group”).
47. United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 770 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v.
Irizarry, 341 F.3d 273, 286 (3d Cir. 2003)). Thus, in Urban, the City of Philadelphia’s con-
struction services department qualified as an enterprise since, inter alia, it was a govern-
mental agency created to issue permits for construction projects, not for “enabling
[defendants’] extortionate acts.” Id. at 770.
48. Smith, 143 F.3d at 1267 (quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583
(1981)).
49. See Michael Vitiello, More Noise from the Tower of Babel: Making “Sense” Out of
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1363, 1400-01 (1995) (noting that the Mafia was
“defined by its hierarchy” and discussing the roles played by the members of the twenty-
four Mafia families).
50. No. 11-CV-1502-PJH, 2015 WL 5138277, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2015).
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ficers from different jurisdictions.51 The enterprise element is not, the
judge noted, an “all or nothing” requirement.52 Thus, the fact that differ-
ent parties took part in the searches with no centralized command or
power structure directing their collective efforts was immaterial in this
regard. The district court also saw no significance in the existence of a
warrant authorizing at least one of the searches attributed to Wielsch.
Even if a valid warrant removed the search itself from the enterprise,
items improperly seized remained within its ambit.53
Capturing the fluidity of Boyle’s interpretation of enterprise, the Elev-
enth Circuit has required no more than “a ‘loose or informal’ association
of distinct entities.”54 Thus, in Murphy v. Farmer,55 a federal district court
in Georgia accepted, for pleading purposes, the plaintiff’s allegation that
multiple defendants and non-parties had created an enterprise to extort
payments and other benefits as part of a prolonged and bitter custody
dispute.56 Membership in the enterprise was diverse and included lawyers
and staff representing plaintiff’s ex-wife, the ex-wife’s brother, a child
custody advocacy group and its owner, a minor who provided testimony
against the plaintiff, and the minor’s mother.57 The predicate acts alleg-
edly committed by the group were equally wide-ranging: attempted ex-
tortion, attempted bribery of a judge, influencing witnesses, kidnapping,
filing a false report of child abuse, and attempted wire fraud, among
others.58
The contribution of different parties varied both temporally and sub-
stantively, and there is no clear indication that any single individual di-
rected all of the alleged misconduct. For example, the plaintiff claims
T.B., a minor child and friend of his children, was flown to the plaintiff’s
home in the Virgin Islands as part of a scheme orchestrated by his ex-wife
to engage the children in drug-related misconduct to promote her claims
that the plaintiff was an unfit parent.59 It is not clear when or if other
members of the enterprise were aware of this plan. Likewise, at least
some of the allegedly unlawful actions taken by Defendant Beacham may
have been devised personally, such as the publication of defamatory
statements about the plaintiff on the website of her organization, My Ad-
51. “The RICO statute,” the judge noted, “does not require constant, uninterrupted
criminal activity.” Id. at *22.
52. Id.
53. Id. The warrant authorized a search for evidence of marijuana cultivation. The
plaintiffs alleged that the officers also seized a number of non-particularized items outside
the scope of the warrant without noting their removal, including shotguns, jewelry, cur-
rency, sunglasses, and sports memorabilia. Id. at *3.
54. Williams v. Mohawk, Indus., 465 F.3d 1277, 1284 (11th Cir. 2006).
55. 176 F. Supp. 3d 1325 (N.D. Ga. 2016).
56. For a general discussion of the RICO’s use in family law litigation, see Erin Alex-
ander, Comment, The Honeymoon Is Over: The Use of Civil RICO in Divorce, 37 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 541 (2000).
57. Murphy, 176 F. Supp. 3d at 1331.
58. Id. at 1338–39.
59. Id. at 1335.
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vocate Center.60
However diffuse the aforementioned actions may be, all are designed
to achieve the same objectives: promoting the ex-wife’s child custody
claims and pressuring the plaintiff to reach a monetary settlement in satis-
faction of the various causes of action filed in relation to the divorce and
child custody disputes. It does not matter, therefore, if the relationships
between certain parties are elusive, or if different participants joined the
enterprise at different times.61 Together, they were all part of what the
plaintiff dubbed a like-minded “conflictineering”62 enterprise.
B. A COMMON PURPOSE?
In United States v. Turkette, the U.S. Supreme Court held that RICO
requires participants in an enterprise to be “associated together for a
common purpose.”63 In that case, the conduct detailed in the complaint
unquestionably met this standard. The defendant was allegedly leading a
criminal organization whose members jointly perpetrated numerous
crimes for financial gain, including: drug trafficking, arson, bribery of
public officials, and mail and wire fraud.64 Civil RICO cases litigated in
the years that immediately followed did not raise “common purpose” is-
sues for the simple reason that, as in Turkette, participants in the alleged
enterprise shared the same objective.
The nature of cases filed during this period underscore this conclusion.
An ABA Task Force reported in 1985 that eighty percent of civil RICO
complaints filed up to this point concerned fraud, the vast majority in the
securities or commercial context.65 Interestingly, these cases generally did
not involve organized crime; only nine percent contained allegations of
criminal activity “generally associated with professional criminals.”66
Zap v. Frankel67 is illustrative of this wave of fraud-based civil RICO
actions that emerged in the early to mid-1980s. In this case, the plaintiff
surrendered his equity interest in an interstate trucking firm to the de-
fendants in exchange for their agreement to make him a partner in a real
60. Id. at 1337–38.
61. See United States v. Hewes, 729 F.2d 1302, 1317 (11th Cir. 1984) (“The law does
not require all members of the RICO enterprise to have maintained their association with
it throughout the enterprise’s life.”).
62. “Conflictineering” is a litigation tactic that is designed to expose immorality that
“creat[es] social and political consequences for adversaries.” Debra Cassens Weiss, Grand-
standing Motions Could Bring Sanctions, Judge Warns in Suit Over Lawyer ‘Conflictineer-
ing’, ABA JOURNAL (Apr. 11, 2016, 5:45 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
grandstanding_motions_could_bring_sanctions_judge_warns_in_suit_over_lawyer [https://
perma.cc/6AS4-5FSW].
63. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981).
64. Id. at 578–79.
65. ARTHUR F. MATTHEWS ET AL., REPORT OF THE AD HOC CIVIL RICO TASK
FORCE OF THE ABA SECTION OF CORPORATION, BANKING AND BUSINESS LAW 55–56
(1985).
66. Id. at 56. Those offenses include arson, bribery, embezzlement, extortion, theft and
political corruption. Id.
67. 770 F.2d 24 (3d Cir. 1985).
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estate venture that owned property leased to the trucking company.
Thereafter, the defendants allegedly defrauded Zap by charging the
trucking company below-market rates for the rental of said property.68 In
addition to RICO, Zap asserted civil claims on a host of other grounds,
including common law fraud and conspiracy, breach of contract and fidu-
ciary duty, and negligence.69
Like myriad other fraud-based civil RICO suits, Zap alleges a “com-
mon purpose” shared by all defendants to profit from an allegedly unlaw-
ful scheme at the plaintiff’s expense. While the Third Circuit allowed the
suit to proceed, other plaintiffs during this period were less successful.
Overall, roughly half of these complaints filed by 1985 were dismissed,70
with even more in the securities context.71 The problems, however, re-
volved around issues other than the defendants’ commonality of
purpose.72
The fact that all parties to a RICO enterprise contribute to the same
fraudulent goal does not necessarily mean, however, that a common pur-
pose exists. In Ray v. Spirit Airlines, Inc.,73 passengers alleged that the
airline, together with other parties, misrepresented base fares by fraudu-
lently labeling part of the total amount charged as a Passenger Usage Fee
impliedly imposed or authorized by the government. Each of the defend-
ants allegedly played a different role in this scheme. For example, one
provided a platform for ticket sales that had been customized to conceal
the fee; another, a computer software consultant, helped the airline de-
sign its website and reservation system; a third handled public relations
around the usage fee.74 As such, the complaint alleged that all defendants
“shared the common purpose to ‘increase and maximize the revenue of
Spirit Airlines.’”75
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, noting that the complaint lacked spe-
cific information suggesting that Spirit paid these parties to deceive con-
sumers, as opposed to providing them “compensation for general
business services rendered.”76 For example, the defendants’ creation of a
software platform manipulated by Spirit to hide the Passenger Usage Fee
does not, without more, connote that these parties knew of or supported
Spirit’s fraudulent purpose, nor is it clear how they profited unlawfully
from the misconduct.77 Likewise, the public relations firm’s efforts to por-
tray the airline in the best possible light is inapposite to the alleged fraud
68. Id. at 25.
69. Id.
70. See MATTHEWS, supra note 65, at 57.
71. Id. at 57–58 (57% dismissed).
72. The dismissals of the complaints were typically based on issues such as inadequate
particularity, failure to name the enterprise as a defendant, failure to specify the plaintiffs’
injuries, or failure to allege a prior criminal conviction. Id. at 58.
73. 836 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2016).
74. Id. at 1345–46.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1353.
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flowing from the presentation of the usage fee on Spirit’s website, since
the firm was not involved in any way in the construction or delivery of
internet-based services.78 Even Spirit’s CEO and Chief Operating Officer
were found to lack a common purpose with the airline since the com-
plaint failed to link either clearly to the confusion surrounding usage fee
charges. There is a difference, the court noted, between sharing the over-
all objective of promoting corporate profits and having a common pur-
pose “to misrepresent fees or otherwise defraud Spirit customers.”79
While it may seem that Ray is using the common purpose requirement
to impose significant limits on the reach of civil RICO, other cases sug-
gest otherwise. For example, in United States v. Church,80 the Eleventh
Circuit held that members of an enterprise demonstrate a common pur-
pose by profiting from “repeated criminal activity,” even if the relevant
conduct is diverse.81 Thus, a changing roster of participants satisfied this
standard by engaging in a wide variety of financially lucrative activity,
including: trafficking in marijuana and cocaine, money laundering; using
violence to protect a participant’s business interests, and conspiring to
rob a drug dealer.82
At first blush, it might seem difficult to reconcile Church with Ray. If
no common purpose existed between Spirit Airlines, its vendors, and cor-
porate officers to hide the Passenger Usage Fee, what objective did an
ever-changing cohort of individuals share when committing a disparate
array of offenses? The distinction likely lies in the illicit nature of the
activities engaged in by the various parties. That is, the activities of
Church’s rotating band of participants were all oriented towards the same
goal: financial gain achieved through drug trafficking. By contrast, there
was nothing inherently illegal about the conduct of the vendors in Ray:
development of a web-based ticketing platform, software consulting ser-
vices to implement Spirit’s website, reservation system, and public rela-
tions support for a company reeling from negative press.
Williams v. Mohawk Industries, Incorporated83 underscores this distinc-
tion between lawful and unlawful conduct in the common purpose con-
text. In their complaint, Williams and other Mohawk employees alleged
that the defendant depressed their wages by hiring undocumented work-
ers.84 The plaintiffs described a scheme whereby recruiters commissioned
78. Id. at 1354.
79. Id. at 1355.
80. 955 F.2d 688 (11th Cir. 1992).
81. Id. at 698.
82. Id.
83. 465 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2006).
84. This cause of action was based on 1996 amendments to RICO that added immigra-
tion offenses to the list of predicate acts that could be used to show a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(F) (2012). These additions included conduct indictable
under a section of the Immigration and Nationality Act pertaining to the unlawful employ-
ment of “unauthorized aliens.” For example, Section 1324 provides that it is unlawful for a
person or other entity to hire, recruit or refer for a fee an alien for employment in the
United States knowing the alien “is an unauthorized alien” with respect to such employ-
1028 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
by Mohawk traveled to the border to find and transport illegal aliens to
Georgia for employment in Mohawk’s facilities.85 Mohawk then paid
recruiters a fee for each worker supplied in this manner.86 Based on these
facts, the court concluded that the parties had “the common purpose of
providing illegal workers to Mohawk so that Mohawk could reduce its
labor costs and the recruiters could get paid.”87
In reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized that RICO requires
only that the enterprise have a common purpose, even if it is not “the sole
purpose of each and every member of the enterprise.”88 In so holding, the
Eleventh Circuit noted its disagreement with the Seventh, where the
court questioned the existence of a common purpose under similar cir-
cumstances in Baker v. IBP, Inc.89 The Baker plaintiffs, hourly wage
earners at the defendant’s meat processing plant, alleged that IBP know-
ingly hired undocumented workers to drive down lawful employees’
wages. To accomplish this, IBP worked with various recruiters as well as
immigrant-welfare organizations, such as the Chinese Mutual Aid Associ-
ation.90 The court characterized each party as having its own distinct in-
terest in the illicit scheme that belied any common purpose: the employer
sought lower wages; the recruiters, greater remuneration for services ren-
dered; and the immigrant organization, better opportunities for their
members.91
The Seventh Circuit’s seemingly narrow reading of the common pur-
pose requirement conflicts not only with the Eleventh Circuit’s more ex-
pansive interpretation but also with of many other circuits, at least
impliedly. Without addressing the common purpose issue explicitly, the
Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have allowed civil RICO claims to pro-
ceed in cases factually similar to Baker and Williams— that is, wage sup-
pression cases based on the use of undocumented workers. In Trollinger
v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,92 plaintiffs alleged that the defendant conspired
with “recruiters and temporary employment agencies to supply it with
illegal immigrant labor.93 In Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Company,94 the de-
ment. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3)(B) (2012). This allowed private parties to seek treble damages
for injuries caused by competitors who knowingly hired undocumented workers. See id.
85. Williams, 465 F.3d at 1284.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1286.
88. Id. at 1285–86.
89. 357 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2004).
90. Id. at 687.
91. Id. at 691. Likewise, in an earlier Seventh Circuit case, the court concluded that no
common purpose existed among a “buying club,” consisting of its franchisees, manufactur-
ers and wholesalers. Stachon v. United Consumers Club, Inc., 229 F.3d 673, 674 (7th Cir.
2000). Plaintiffs alleged that the parties fraudulently represented that club members could
purchase top quality merchandise at reduced prices from a host of vendors. Id. at 674.
Even accepting this assertion as true, each party was pursuing its own unique financial
objective, the court opined, rendering it improbable that “the enterprise had a common
purpose to benefit consumers (or UCC members) as a whole.” Id. at 677 n.4.
92. 370 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 2004).
93. Id. at 606.
94. 301 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2002).
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fendants’ two fruit companies perpetrated an alleged “Illegal Immigrant
Hiring Scheme,” facilitated by an employment agency, used as a front for
their nefarious activities.95 Finally, the plaintiffs in Commercial Cleaning
Services, LLC v. Colin Service Systems, Inc.96 contended that the defen-
dant, a business competitor, knowingly paid numerous illegal immigrants
reduced wages while simultaneously failing to deduct payroll taxes and
workers’ compensation insurance fees. The enterprise carrying out this
scheme included various entities associated-in-fact, including employ-
ment placement agencies, labor contractors, newspapers, and networks
that help illegal immigrants obtain employment, housing and work
permits.97
United States v. Masters98 casts doubt, however, on the extent to which
the Seventh Circuit has truly embraced such a cramped view of the com-
mon purpose requirement. Masters was an attorney who, along with two
police supervisors and their respective police departments, engaged in
kickback schemes to refer work to Masters and bribed law enforcement
personnel to protect individuals engaged in illegal bookmaking. During
this same period, at Masters’s request, one of the police supervisors also
hired a former co-worker to kill Masters’s wife after unlawful eavesdrop-
ping disclosed lurid details of an extramarital affair. Based on the forego-
ing, the court noted that the enterprise’s main purpose “was to bring
under Masters’[s] influence . . . the principal police agencies operating in
his area of activity.”99 Because Masters conflated his business and per-
sonal life “[l]ike many a small businessman,” it was “natural” for him to
rely on the existing criminal enterprise to resolve marital difficulties that
he believed necessitated the murder of his wife;100 the enterprise was,
in sum, “versatile, flexible, [and] diverse in its objectives and
capabilities.”101
While the reasoning in Masters appears at odds with that of Baker, it is
noteworthy that the latter made no reference to Masters—or any other
case—in its brief discussion of common purpose. This lack of attribution
is unsurprising inasmuch as the court’s reflections on common purpose
were essentially dicta; the complaint was invalidated on other grounds.102
Moreover, requiring all members of an enterprise to share one overarch-
95. Id. at 1166–67.
96. 271 F.3d 374 (2d Cir. 2001).
97. Id. at 379. One commentator has advocated the use of civil RICO on behalf of
immigrant workers to combat abusive labor practices by employers. Jennifer J. Lee, Private
Civil Remedies: A Viable Tool for Guest Worker Enforcement, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 31,
56–62 (2012).
98. 924 F.2d 1362 (7th Cir. 1991).
99. Id. at 1366.
100. Id. at 1366–67.
101. Id. at 1367. See generally Steven P. Ragland, Comment, Using the Master’s Tools:
Fighting Persistent Police Misconduct with Civil RICO, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 139 (2001);
Michael Rowan, Comment, Leaving No Stone Unturned: Using Civil RICO as a Remedy
for Police Misconduct, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 231 (2003).
102. Baker v. IBP, Inc., 357 F.3d 685, 691 (7th Cir. 2004) (identifying the complaint’s
failure to specify an enterprise as its “fatal problem”).
1030 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
ing purpose would represent bad policy as it would reduce RICO’s immi-
gration amendments to a virtual nullity since association-in-fact entities
are certain to have both lawful and unlawful objectives that exist simulta-
neously. For example, the defendants accused of engaging in the illegal
hiring of immigrants in RICO lawsuits are invariably acting in concert
with employment agencies or recruiters.103 Unless these organizations ex-
ist solely to facilitate unlawful labor practices, which is highly unlikely,104
they will necessarily have more than one purpose. Immigrants’ rights or-
ganizations, a fortiori, engage in important lawful activities designed to
increase the quality of life for disadvantaged communities.
The activities of the enterprise in United States v. Masters105 were even
more wide-ranging. Accordingly, what remains clear is that most courts
require a common unlawful purpose among members of the enterprise.
The Mohawk plaintiffs satisfied this standard in asserting that the defen-
dant and outside employment personnel worked together to further the
hiring of illegal immigrants. By contrast, the plaintiffs in Ray failed to
proffer any facts that indicated how or why public relations consultants
and the vendors who worked on the airline’s computer reservation sys-
tem endeavored to fraudulently hide its Passenger Usage Fee; the only
purpose shared by these parties was a lawful one: improving Spirit’s prof-
itability and reputation.
Seen in this light, the common purpose requirement does little to limit
the reach of civil RICO. Provided they can identify unlawful conduct
within the statute’s purview to which all members of the enterprise con-
tributed, plaintiffs will generally satisfy this requirement. The existence of
additional, diverse objectives not shared by others is irrelevant. Even the
requirement of illicit activity can be somewhat attenuated. In Masters, the
court identified the enterprise’s principal objective as bringing certain po-
lice departments within the ringleader’s sphere of influence to allow him
to perpetrate a wide range of crimes, some totally disconnected in pur-
pose and scope from others.106
The breadth of the common purpose requirement is especially concern-
ing in the context of enterprises comprised of loosely connected associa-
tions-in-fact. In rejecting the need for a businesslike hierarchy in RICO
enterprises, the U.S. Supreme Court in Boyle relied on common purpose
to define structural requirements, identifying three indispensable fea-
tures: “a purpose, relationships among those associated with the enter-
prise, and longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the
103. For an excellent discussion of the use of civil RICO in the immigration employ-
ment context, see generally Mary Catherine G. Isensee, Comment, Enforcing Against the
Enforcers: Ensuring Immigration Compliance Through Civil RICO, 49 HOUS. L. REV. 101
(2012).
104. Even Selective Employment Agency, Inc., which allegedly served as a front com-
pany for the defendants’ unlawful employment practices in Mendoza, was a separate legal
entity under separate ownership. See Complaint at ¶ 40, Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., No.
00-cv-03024 (E.D. Wash., Mar. 28, 2000), 2000 WL 34480427.
105. 924 F.2d 1362 (7th Cir. 1991).
106. See supra text accompanying notes 83–86.
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enterprise’s purpose.”107 Thus, the justices noted, a RICO enterprise de-
mands more than a criminal conspiracy, whose completion requires only
the time necessary to form an agreement and execute an overt act in fur-
therance of it.108 For example, an individual who conspires to commit
arson is not part of a RICO enterprise to do the same unless he and his
co-conspirators have a shared purpose to commit, and do commit, a pat-
tern of arson offenses.109
While this may be true, it has little bearing in reality on the potential
breadth of RICO enterprises that are often wide-ranging, diffuse entities
whose “common purpose” may be secondary—even tertiary—to the day-
to-day operations of its various members. The Seventh Circuit has even
questioned the extent to which Boyle meaningfully distinguishes RICO
enterprises from most conspiracies.110 In Jay E. Hayden Foundation v.
First Neighbor Bank, N.A.,111 the plaintiff foundation and two affiliated
estates, all of which were created by Mr. Hayden’s will, alleged that they
were defrauded by a RICO enterprise comprised of the entities’ joint ex-
ecutor, as well as law firms and bank officers used by the executor in the
course of his duties. The court noted that these otherwise independent
actors met Boyle’s three requirements: they pursued a common purpose,
relied on their relationships to each other to do so, and depleted the
plaintiffs’ accounts valued at more than one million dollars over a period
of sixteen years.112 As such, it is the “longevity” requirement that typi-
cally differentiates most conspiracies from RICO enterprises, inasmuch
as the former need only exist for a period of time long enough to forge an
agreement and commit an overt act in furtherance of it.113
IV. CAUSATION CONFUSION
Like the elasticity inherent in the structural and common purpose re-
quirements, the ambiguity surrounding civil RICO’s causation require-
ments contributes to the uncertainty surrounding the statute’s breadth,
emboldening those who favor more permissive standards.114 The source
107. Boyle v. United States., 556 U.S. 938, 946 (2009).
108. Id. at 949–50.
109. Id. Thus, in Stachon, the Seventh Circuit found that plaintiffs’ allegations de-
scribed merely a conspiracy between a “buying club” and other entities to fraudulently sell
discounted goods. Stachon v. United Consumers Club, 229 F.3d 673, 676 (7th Cir. 2000).
The buying club directed all of the group’s activities; there was no “command structure”
distinct from it that would allow the group to function as a RICO organization. See id.
110. See Pierson, supra note 2, at 561–62 (noting the challenges inherent in differentiat-
ing association-in-fact enterprises from conspiracies after Boyle).
111. 610 F.3d 382 (7th Cir. 2010).
112. Id. at 384, 388–89.
113. In Jay E. Hayden Found., the court upheld the dismissal of the suit nonetheless,
noting that the complaint failed to allege that the conspirators used the enterprise to en-
gage in a pattern of racketeering activity. They did not allege, for example, that the defen-
dant bank officers had used the bank to assist the executor in perpetrating the fraud. These
pleading deficits failed, in the end, to differentiate the enterprise from the conspiracy. Id.
at 389.
114. Under Section 1964(c), civil causes of action are available only to those injured “by
reason of” a defendant’s RICO violation. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012).
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of the confusion lies, first and foremost, with U.S. Supreme Court case
law, to which we now turn.
A. THE SUPREME COURT AND PROXIMATE CAUSATION
Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.115 was the Court’s first
major case addressing civil RICO’s causation requirements. In it, respon-
dent Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) alleged that peti-
tioner Holmes was part of a conspiracy to manipulate stock prices which
led to the inability of two broker-dealers to meet their financial obliga-
tions to customers thereby triggering the respondent’s statutory duty to
do so on the broker-dealers’ behalf. To merit recovery, the majority speci-
fied that SIPC would need to establish that Holmes’ conduct was both the
“but for” and the proximate cause of its injuries.116 Taking account of
common-law requirements, proximate causation requires “some direct
relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct al-
leged.”117 Thus, the Court found it to be lacking here since the harm that
flowed from the stock-manipulation scheme targeted the broker-dealers;
any injury to SIPC was necessarily secondary and contingent, making it
too remote to satisfy the directness requirement.118
Fourteen years later, the Court revisited the Holmes causation standard
in Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp.119 In this case, the respondent corpo-
ration alleged that petitioners Joseph and Vincent Anza, owners of Na-
tional Steel Supply, charged lower prices to its cash-paying customers by
fraudulently failing to impose state sales tax thereby disadvantaging
Ideal, its principal competitor. The Second Circuit found sufficient proxi-
mate causation based on these facts, reasoning that the complaint alleged
that the Anzas “intended to and did give the defendant[s] a competitive
advantage over the plaintiff,”120 based on a pattern of racketeering
activity.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.121 The majority recognized that this
case differed factually from Holmes in that the harm suffered by the
plaintiff was not contingent on the conduct of a third party.122 Nonethe-
less, the Court found proximate cause to be lacking, noting that the “di-
rect victim” of the brothers’ misconduct was the State of New York, not
the plaintiff.123 Consideration of the underlying premises of the direct-
ness requirement underscored the majority’s conclusion. First, it would be
difficult to determine the extent to which the defendants’ alleged fraud,
115. 503 U.S. 258 (1992).
116. Id. at 268.
117. Id. at 268–69.
118. Id. at 270–71.
119. 547 U.S. 451 (2006).
120. Ideal Steel Supply Corp. v. Anza, 373 F.3d 251, 263 (2d Cir. 2004).
121. Anza, 547 U.S. at 462.
122. Id. at 458.
123. Id.
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as opposed to other factors, contributed to its lowering of prices.124 Like-
wise, the origin of plaintiff’s lost sales would be tough to ascertain with
any certainty since decreased revenue can result for myriad reasons.125
Finally, the majority opined that a direct causal relationship is “especially
warranted” where, as here, the primary victim of the alleged fraud is able
to pursue, and accurately quantify, the financial injury suffered.126 In
sum, even if the defendants’ intentional, fraudulent conduct were seen as
targeting Ideal, the “indirect route” taken to accomplish its objectives ne-
gated proximate causation.127
As the foregoing makes clear, Anza adopts a narrow reading of
Holmes that focuses the proximate causation inquiry on the directness of
the injury to the plaintiff. In 2008, the Supreme Court revisited this issue
to resolve a different issue over which a circuit split had emerged:
whether proximate causation required proof that the plaintiff had detri-
mentally relied on a defendant’s misrepresentations.128 In Bridge v. Phoe-
nix Bond & Indemnity Co.,129 Respondent Phoenix claimed that
Petitioner Bridge and his associates fraudulently manipulated the bidding
process at county tax-lien auctions to acquire a greater number of proper-
ties. To accomplish these objectives, petitioners allegedly lied to county
officials about their compliance with a rule that disallowed multiple
agents of a given competitor to participate in the rotational bidding pro-
cedure. Arguing that proximate causation requires first-party reliance on
a defendant’s misrepresentations, petitioners contended that Phoenix’s
RICO claim failed since any fraudulent statements by Bridge and his as-
sociates were made to the county, not to the plaintiff/respondent.130 The
Court disagreed, holding that first-party reliance was unnecessary to es-
tablish proximate causation.131
In a different section of its opinion, the Court spoke more generally
about proximate cause requirements in civil RICO, and it is these state-
ments that have created confusion. Factually distinguishing Holmes and
Anza, the majority noted the directness of Phoenix’s alleged injury in los-
ing valuable tax liens, remarking that there is “no more immediate victim
. . . better situated to sue.”132 It commented, at the same time, that the
harm to the respondents was “a foreseeable and natural consequence” of
petitioners’ fraudulent scheme.133 This seeming embrace of foreseeability
is both novel and curious. It had been mentioned only once previously in
this context, ironically in an opinion by Justice Thomas dissenting from
the Court’s definition of proximate causation. Thomas advocated a stan-
124. Id.
125. Id. at 459.
126. Id. at 460.
127. Id. at 460–61.
128. Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., 553 U.S. 639, 641–42 (2008).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 648.
131. Id. at 660.
132. Id. at 658.
133. Id.
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dard broader than that of the Anza majority that would extend civil
RICO liability to “indirect consequences that are foreseeable.”134 To see
this foreseeability language adopted two years later by a majority of the
Court in Bridge is odd, to say the least.
In a purported attempt to demystify this causation conundrum, Hemi
Group, LLC v. City of New York135 addressed the foreseeability issue
directly in 2010; unfortunately, its splintered reasoning only heightened
the confusion. The New Mexico-based Hemi Group, the plaintiff/peti-
tioner in this action, sold cigarettes online to customers in New York City
tax free. To allow the City to collect taxes from the purchasers, federal
law required Hemi to file paperwork with the State of New York which,
in turn, forwards the documentation to the City so that it can seek collec-
tion from its residents. Hemi Group’s failure to do so led the City to bring
a civil RICO claim against it, claiming that Hemi Group’s conduct de-
prived the City of “tens of millions of dollars” in lost tax revenues.136
In dismissing the complaint, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by three
others, found that the petitioner’s violation of federal reporting require-
ments under the Jenkins Act137 did not lead directly to the respondent’s
injuries. On the contrary, whereas the City’s lost revenue resulted from
customers’ failure to pay cigarette taxes, the alleged fraud relied on en-
tirely separate conduct: the failure to file reports mandated by federal
law.138 The necessity of going “well beyond the first step” to identify the
plaintiff’s injury precluded satisfaction of RICO’s proximate cause re-
quirement.139 Justice Ginsburg joined in the dismissal of the complaint on
different grounds related to limitations on recovery under the Jenkins
Act, adding that she did not “subscrib[e] to the broader range of the
Court’s proximate cause analysis.”140
Three dissenting justices believed that proximate cause existed, as-
sailing the majority’s focus on the directness of the injury in evaluating
proximate causation.141 Directness, Justice Breyer opined, has tradition-
ally operated to expand liability beyond what is foreseeable, not diminish
it.142 Thus, because the harm to the City was plainly foreseeable from
Hemi Group’s failure to supply the names of purchasers to the State, the
complaint satisfied proximate causation requirements.143
Because Justice Sotomayor did not participate in the case, Hemi Group
provides no clear guidance on the role of foreseeability in civil RICO’s
134. Id. at 469–70 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 42 (5th ed. 1984)).
135. 559 U.S. 1 (2010).
136. Id. at 4.
137. 15 U.S.C. §§ 375–378 (2012).
138. Hemi Group, 559 U.S. at 11.
139. Id. at 10.
140. Id. at 19 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
141. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 25 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 25–26 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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proximate cause analysis.144 Four members of the Court unequivocally
rejected it;145 one refused to join in that rejection; three affirmatively em-
braced it; and one has taken no official position on the issue, but tends to
side with those who favored it. In light of this uncertain terrain, it should
come as no surprise that lower courts have struggled to understand how
best to articulate proximate cause requirements in this context. RICO
complaints filed against pharmaceutical companies in recent years have
been especially useful in highlighting the controversy and its
ramifications.
B. PROXIMATE CAUSATION, CIVIL RICO, AND “BIG PHARMA”
Since Hemi Group was handed down in 2010, drug manufacturers have
defended, or continued to defend, a number of lawsuits brought under
civil RICO by third-party payers alleging fraud in the marketing of high-
profile medications. For example, in 2010, a jury assessed damages of
$140 million to Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. and Kaiser Founda-
tion Hospitals (collectively Kaiser) against the international drug manu-
facturer Pfizer for fraud in the publicity and marketing of Neurontin for
off-label uses.146 In affirming the verdict,147 the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit addressed proximate causation at length. Significantly,
relying heavily on Bridge, it framed the Supreme Court’s directness re-
quirement in terms of foreseeability, referencing the “core . . . principle
of “allowing compensation for those who are directly injured, whose in-
jury was plainly foreseeable and was in fact foreseen, and who were the
intended victims of the defendant’s wrongful conduct.”148 It also dis-
missed as irrelevant the argument that doctors function as “independent
intervening causes” whose prescribing practices depend on factors unre-
lated to Pfizer’s marketing of a particular drug; rather than breaking the
causal chain, as the defendant urged, the court believed that this concern
sounded instead in the quantification of damages owed by Pfizer.149
Perhaps even more noteworthy than its focus on Bridge is the First
Circuit’s adoption of Justice Breyer’s proximate cause analysis in his
Hemi Group dissent. It is not only difficult to square this approach with
the Chief Justice’s opinion in Hemi Group, it is hard to reconcile it with
the Supreme Court’s earlier decisions in Holmes and Anza which, as the
Chief Justice noted in Hemi Group, made no mention whatsoever of
foreseeability.150
The Third Circuit articulated a similar causation standard in In re
144. Id. at 18 (majority opinion).
145. Justice Thomas, who had affirmatively embraced foreseeability in Anza, see supra
text accompanying note 131, paradoxically joined the Chief Justice’s opinion rejecting it
here.
146. In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 712 F.3d 21, 25–26 (1st Cir. 2013).
147. Id. at 31–40, 51.
148. Id. at 38.
149. Id. at 39, 42–43.
150. Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 12 (2010).
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Avandia Marketing, Sales Practices & Product Liability Litigation.151 In
this case, third-party payors (TPPs) alleged that the drug manufacturer
GlaxoSmithKline misrepresented and concealed safety risks associated
with certain diabetes medications to convince plaintiffs to include these
drugs on their “formularies”152 and thereby suffer financial harm. In eval-
uating proximate causation, the appellate court concluded that, as in
Bridge, the plaintiffs were the “primary and intended victims” of the de-
fendant’s fraud and their financial injury was a “foreseeable and natural
consequence of the scheme.”153 The court also specified the uniqueness
of the plaintiffs’ economic harm, reasoning that doctors suffered no direct
harm while any physical harm suffered by patients was altogether differ-
ent such that it had no relevance to proximate causation regarding
TPPs.154
Ironically, in a case with remarkably similar facts, the Second Circuit
found proximate cause lacking.155 As in In re Avandia, the plaintiffs in
this RICO action were TPPs suing drug manufacturers for fraudulent
misrepresentations concerning an expensive medication (Zyprexa) that
led to its inclusion on the plaintiffs’ formularies.156 Unlike the Third Cir-
cuit, the Second Circuit emphasized the case’s similarity to Hemi Group,
concluding that the plaintiffs’ theory of liability was too attenuated in that
it relied on the independent conduct “of third and even fourth parties”
including doctors, Pharmacy Benefits Managers, and their Pharmacy and
Therapeutics Committees.157
The Seventh Circuit recently added its voice in a RICO suit filed by
TPPs against the drug manufacturer Abbott Laboratories for the alleg-
edly fraudulent marketing of the anti-seizure medication Depakote for
off-label uses.158 Noting the disagreement among the circuits that have
addressed proximate causation in this context, the court agreed with the
Second Circuit’s reasoning, finding that the causal chain was too long to
satisfy the directness standard articulated in the Chief Justice’s principal
opinion in Hemi Group.159 The court emphasized that the misrepresenta-
tions at issue were directed at physicians, leaving open—at least im-
pliedly—the potential for a different result if the defendants directed
their fraudulent marketing campaign directly to TPPs, as was the case in
In re Neurontin and In re Avandia.160
151. See 804 F.3d 633 (3d Cir. 2015).
152. Id. at 626. If a drug is placed on the formulary, it acquires preferred status over
competing drugs, which results in the plan assuming a greater percentage of the cost for the
medication vis-a`-vis plan members. See id. at 634–35.
153. Id. at 645 (citing Bridge v. Phx. Board & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 658 (2008)).
154. Id. at 644.
155. UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121, 134 (2d Cir. 2010).
156. Id. at 129.
157. Id. at 134 (quoting Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 10 (2010)).
158. Sidney Hillman Health Ctr. of Rochester v. Abbott Labs., 873 F.3d 574, 575–76
(7th Cir. 2017).
159. Id. at 578.
160. Id.
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The uncertainty surrounding proximate causation is perhaps best illus-
trated by the ongoing multidistrict federal litigation by TPPs against man-
ufacturers, sellers, and promoters of testosterone replacement therapy
drugs in which the plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that defendants engaged in
fraudulent marketing schemes that entitle them to damages under RICO.
In a 2016 decision, the district court forthrightly noted that “[t]he parties
disagree about the appropriate proximate cause standard that applies to
civil RICO claims.”161 Unsurprisingly, the plaintiff focused on Bridge, ar-
guing that it was the intended target of the defendants’ conduct and its
injuries were a “foreseeable and natural consequence” of the marketing
scheme at issue.162 By contrast, defendants focused on the directness of
the injury to the alleged misconduct, which more closely tracks the analy-
sis applied by the Supreme Court in Holmes, Anza, and Hemi Group’s
plurality opinion.163 They asserted, to that end, that proximate causation
was lacking because “too many independent steps . . . separate[d] the
misconduct and the injury,” including the personal prerogatives of pa-
tients and physicians vis-a`-vis medication choices.164
The district court sided with the plaintiff.165 In so doing, however, the
judge did not focus on Bridge’s foreseeability language. Instead, he em-
phasized the “direct misrepresentations” made by the defendants to the
plaintiff that led the TPP to include testosterone replacement medica-
tions on its formularies, noting that any steps that occur between the al-
leged fraud and the plaintiff’s injury do not interrupt the “direct and
immediate” relationship between those events.166 This analysis echoes
the Seventh Circuit’s reference the following year in Sidney Hillman
Health Center of Rochester to the potential significance in the proximate
cause context of the party to whom the alleged fraud is directed.167 Curi-
ously, this is not a consideration that the U.S. Supreme Court has high-
lighted to date, perhaps because its importance is more paramount in
pharmaceutical cases than in the other, diverse contexts addressed by the
justices in civil RICO litigation.
V. FROM THE MOB TO THE #METOO MOVEMENT
Keeping in mind that the U.S. government enacted RICO to eradicate
organized crime, the foregoing paints a far different modern-day picture.
We have learned that a RICO enterprise may be a loose, informal associ-
161. In re Testosterone Replacement Therapy Prods. Liab. Litig. Coordinated Pretrial
Proceedings, 159 F. Supp. 3d 898, 916 (N.D. Ill. 2016).
162. Id. at 917.
163. Id. at 917–18.
164. Id. at 918.
165. Id. at 919–20.
166. Id. at 919. In the court’s only implicit reference to Bridge, it noted that, when
fraudulent misrepresentations of the kind alleged here so “infect” the chain of causation
that a TPP unwittingly includes a medication in its formulary, “it becomes virtually inevita-
ble (and thus foreseeable) that it will pay for unnecessary, off-label uses of the drug.” Id.
167. Sidney Hillman Health Ctr. Of Rochester v. Abbott Labs., 873 F.3d 574, 578 (7th
Cir. 2017).
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ation-in-fact of distinct entities that lacks any formal hierarchical struc-
ture. The enterprise must have a “common purpose,” but that unlawful
purpose need not reflect participants’ primary, day-to-day conduct; enter-
prises can be, and often are, versatile, flexible, and diverse entities. And
while there must be a direct relationship between the enterprise’s alleg-
edly unlawful conduct and plaintiff’s injury, the precise parameters of this
connection remain unclear. It may be enough that the conduct is inten-
tional and the harm foreseeable.
This thumbnail portrait of civil RICO provides a backdrop to the com-
plaint filed on December 6, 2017 by six women against Harvey Weinstein
and others, including Miramax Film Corporation.168 The named plaintiffs
purport to represent a “Nationwide Class” of women who had face-to-
face interaction with Weinstein for purposes of employment with his com-
pany or Miramax.169 According to the complaint, Weinstein, aided by
firms and entertainment executives with whom he worked, constituted
the “Weinstein Sexual Enterprise” whose common purpose “was to har-
ass and mislead Class members and the media to prevent the victims from
reporting Weinstein’s sexual misconduct and to destroy evidence.”170
The complaint recounts the personal experiences of the six named
plaintiffs, all of whom describe how Weinstein assaulted them sexually
with the cooperation and assistance of members of the Weinstein Sexual
Enterprise.171 The complaint also includes less detailed accounts of sexual
assault from a host of other women, a number of whom are prominent
film actresses, such as Rosanna Arquette, Ashley Judd, and Angelina
Jolie.172 Collectively, according to the plaintiffs, these accounts establish a
pattern of racketeering activity through ongoing violations of federal laws
pertaining to mail and wire fraud, witness tampering, and “obtaining a
victim for the purpose of committing or attempting to commit aggravated
sexual abuse.”173 As a result of this alleged abuse perpetrated by the en-
terprise, plaintiffs claim “injur[y] in their property and business” through
loss of “employment and employment opportunities, as well [as] . . . con-
tractual opportunities.”174
An assessment of the complaint’s likelihood of success on the merits of
the RICO claim requires identification of those issues that are most, and
least, challenging for plaintiffs. First, we can expect the defendants to
168. Complaint at 1, Geiss v. Weinstein Co. Holdings, LLC, No. 1:17-cv-09554
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2017).
169. Id. at 51.
170. Id. at 40.
171. For example, Katherine Kendall describes an incident in 1993 when Weinstein
chased her around his apartment naked, demanding sexual favors. When she refused, he
told her he was insulted, commenting that actresses do this sort of thing all the time. Id. at
20–22.
172. For example, the complaint alleges that Weinstein made “unwanted advances” to-
wards Jolie in her hotel room and, when Arquette visited his hotel room, Weinstein alleg-
edly forced her to massage his neck and “pulled her hand towards his erect penis.” Id. at
18.
173. Id. at 56.
174. Id. at 58–59.
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challenge the existence of a RICO enterprise, arguing that the alleged
members of the “Weinstein Sexual Enterprise” are, in fact, no more than
a haphazard assortment of individuals who sporadically and episodically
helped Weinstein manage his business relationships. However, this con-
tention, even if true, does not negate the existence of an association-in-
fact enterprise which, as we have seen, may be a loose and informal group
of distinct entities who participate in the organization of unlawful activi-
ties at different times and in different ways.175
Likewise, defendants will struggle to refute plaintiffs’ satisfaction of the
common purpose requirement. The complaint clearly describes a scheme
whereby members of the enterprise worked together to achieve unlawful
objectives related to facilitating, and subsequently covering up, sexual
misconduct. In cases where the court found common purpose to be lack-
ing, such as Ray v. Spirit Airlines, various members had no identifiable
interest in pursuing the alleged unlawful objectives.176 In the instant case,
by contrast, the entities and individuals assisting Weinstein shared an in-
terest in covering up his felonious conduct to safeguard his reputation
and preserve the economic vitality of his projects whose profitability in-
ured to their benefit either directly or indirectly.
Causation, on the other hand, poses a far greater challenge for the
plaintiffs. To establish proximate cause, they must show a direct relation-
ship between the enterprise’s unlawful conduct and the injury suffered.
Even accepting plaintiffs’ allegations as true, the link between the sexual
misconduct and the loss of employment opportunity may be too attenu-
ated to satisfy the Supreme Court’s proximate cause standard articulated
in Hemi Group and earlier cases. Employment opportunity in the en-
tertainment industry undoubtedly is influenced by subjective and inde-
pendent factors, such as talent, availability, and presence in the right
place at the right time. Similar arguments held sway in the Second Circuit
case of UFCW Local 1776 where the Court dismissed TPPs’ RICO claims
against the manufacturers of Zyprexa, finding that any allegedly fraudu-
lent marketing was insufficiently connected to plaintiffs’ financial harm
due to the decisional intervention of other parties.177
On the other hand, the causation standard forwarded in Bridge sup-
ports a different conclusion: proximate cause exists because the plaintiffs
were the intended victims of the defendants’ misconduct, and the plain-
tiffs’ loss of opportunity was a natural and foreseeable consequence in
light of Weinstein’s power and influence in the entertainment industry.178
Moreover, proximate causation requires proof that the defendants’ con-
duct was a substantial cause, not the sole cause, of plaintiffs’ injuries.179
Additionally, cases involving fraudulent marketing of medication by
175. See supra text accompanying notes 38–62.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 73–75.
177. UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121, 134 (2d Cir. 2010).
178. Complaint, supra note 168, at 58–59.
179. See, e.g., Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 370 F.2d 602, 620 (6th Cir. 2004).
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pharmaceutical companies provide an imperfect analogy. Doctors and
Pharmacy Benefit Managers wield independent authority in prescribing
medication or determining its suitability for inclusion on a health plan’s
formulary. By contrast, Weinstein’s power is so all-consuming as to over-
whelm the contribution of any otherwise independent actor in the chain
of authority for hiring decisions in Hollywood.180
In sum, then, the civil RICO action against Harvey Weinstein and his
associates, while provocative, is viable. And that is the point. By the end
of 2017, a federal statute passed decades ago to undermine the Cosa Nos-
tra is targeting instead the “Weinstein Sexual Enterprise” and has in-
jected itself into messy divorce proceedings, educational fraud, police
misconduct, and even animal rights.181 RICO has truly run amok, and
Congress does not seem to care.
180. See Complaint, supra note 168, at 10–11 (detailing Weinstein’s power and influ-
ence in the film industry).
181. See Feld Entm’t, Inc. v. Am. Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 873 F.
Supp. 2d 288, 332–33 (D.D.C. 2012) (denying motion to dismiss). The plaintiff, owner of
Ringling Brothers and Barnum & Bailey Circus, sued the ASPCA and other animal-rights
organizations under RICO for paying a fact witness, later found not to be credible, in
litigation over the circus’s use of elephants. On December 28, 2012, the ASPCA settled
with Feld for 9.3 million dollars. See Meredith Bennett-Smith, Ringling Bros. Wins $9.3
Million In Settlement From ASCPA Over Claims Of Elephant Abuse, HUFFPOST (Dec. 31,
2012), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/31/ringling-bros-wins-93-million-aspca-ele
phant-abuse-in-question_n_2388822.html [https://perma.cc/3CX2-FSLR]. For criticism of
the use of civil RICO in this context, see Jaime I. Roth, Reptiles in the Weeds: Civil RICO
vs. the First Amendment in the Animal Rights Debate, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 467 (2002).
